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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD KENNETH LAMBETH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040595-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
it J? & 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2003), and one count of 
disorderly conduct, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 
(2003), in the Second District Court, Weber County, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 
2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
May defendant challenge the lawfulness of a search incident to arrest by 
claiming that the statute under which the arrest occurred is unconstitutional? 
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on the validity of a search or seizure as a 
mixed question of law and fact. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95 ^ 15, 512 Utah Adv. Rep. 
49. The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under a deferential clearly erroneous 
standard. Id. The court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, without 
deference to the trial court. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
This case requires the interpretation and application of the following constitutional 
provisions and statutes: 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Article 1, Section 14, Utah Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102 (2003) 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move 
from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically 
offensive condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening 
behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be heard 
in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to 
which the public or a substantial group of the public has access and 
includes but is not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of 
schools, hospitals, apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, 
and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues 
after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 19, 2003, the State charged defendant with one count of possession 
of a controlled substance and one count of disorderly conduct (R. 1). Defendant moved 
to suppress evidence of his possession of methamphetamine as the fruit of an illegal 
arrest (R. 29-30). He claimed that no offense occurred because the disorderly conduct 
statute under which he was arrested was unconstitutional (R. 24-25, 26). He concluded 
that because no offense occurred, there was no probable cause to arrest, and therefore the 
search incident to arrest during which the methamphetamine was discovered was 
unlawful (R. 25, 27). A suppression hearing was held after which the court denied 
defendant's motion (R. 42; 69.28). It found that defendant intentionally caused public 
alarm by making unreasonable noises (R. 43-44; 69:28). The court ruled that 
defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of the disorderly conduct statute and that his 
conduct was not protected by the First Amendment (R. 44; 69:28). 
Defendant entered a Sery plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion 
to suppress (R. 48). In exchange for the plea, the state reduced count one from a second 
degree felony to a third degree felony (R. 52). Defendant was sentenced to concurrent 
terms of zero to five years in prison for possession of a controlled substance, and ninety-
days in jail for disorderly conduct (R. 55). Defendant timely appealed (R. 58). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On Thursday December 18th, 2003, Sergeant McAllister and Detective Hanson of 
the Ogden Police Department went to a 7-Eleven in downtown Ogden to get a drink and a 
donut (R. 69:5). As they walked toward the 7-Eleven entrance, they heard someone 
loudly yell, "fucking pigs!" (R. 69:5, 6). They turned toward the gas pumps and saw 
defendant, whom they both recognized from prior dealings (R. 69:6-7). 
Defendant was 60 or 70 feet away from the officers, but "there was no difficulty in 
hearing" what he said because defendant was yelling "extremely loud[ly]" (R. 69:7-8). 
When he turned to look at defendant, Sergeant McAllister noticed a lady near defendant 
pumping gas into a van occupied by several small children (R. 69:8-9). This lady's "eyes 
got big and she seemed to hurry and finish pumping her gas" (R. 69:9). Hoping to avoid 
an unnecessary confrontation, Sergeant McAllister told Detective Hanson, "let's just 
ignore him," and they continued walking toward the front doors of the 7-11 (R. 69:9). As 
they reached the doors, defendant yelled, "extremely loud[ly], even louder than the first" 
time, "suck my dick!" (R. 69:9). 
When defendant yelled the second time, Sergeant McAllister noticed that the 
woman at the pump "hurried and got in and drove away," presumably "to get herself and 
her kids away from him" (R. 69:9). Sergeant McAllister told defendant, "Richard, you 
better stop" (R. 69:9). Immediately after warning defendant, two ladies walked toward 
the front doors of the 7-11 (R. 69:11). Sergeant McAllister opened the door for them to 
1
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
4 
walk out, and as they did defendant yelled "flick" just as loud as he had yelled "suck my 
dick" (R. 69:11). The ladies were "shocked," and "their eyes got kind of wide" (R. 
69:11). They were "hesitant to come out" of the 7-11, because "[t]hey were like, what's 
going on out here" (R. 69:11). 
At this point Sergeant McAllister decided to talk to defendant and began to walk 
towards him (R. 69:12). Defendant continued to loudly yell at Sergeant McAllister (R. 
69:12). Sergeant McAllister then arrested defendant for disorderly conduct (R. 69:12-
13). During the search incident to the arrest, officers found two baggies containing 
methamphetamine residue (R. 35). 
After the arrest, defendant requested to speak with Sergeant McAllister (R. 69:18-
19). Sergeant McAllister went over to the patrol car where defendant was handcuffed (R. 
69:19). Defendant apologized for "calling [the officers] fucking pigs and for yelling" (R. 
69:19). Sergeant McAllister responded, "not just me, who did you affect?" (R. 69:19). 
Defendant admitted, "the people around" (R. 69:19). 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the 
search incident to arrest, the court found that (1) the officers were able to hear defendant 
yelling from over seventy feet away; (2) the patrons of the 7-Eleven appeared to be 
disturbed by defendant's conduct; (3) the women pumping gas near defendant was 
justifiably alarmed by his conduct; and (4) "Although the Defendant used profanity, it 
was not the content of the dialogue, it was the manner and tone in which said the 
statements that triggered the statute" (R. 42-44). From its findings, the court ruled that 
defendant made unreasonable noise in a public place with the intent to cause 
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inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm and that defendant's conduct was not protected by 
the First Amendment (R. 44). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant may not challenge the validity of a search incident to arrest by claiming 
that the statute under which the arrest was made is unconstitutional. An arrest supported 
by probable cause is valid despite a later judicial determination that the statute 
authorizing the arrest is unconstitutional. The only exception to this rule is for statutes 
that are so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that a person of reasonable prudence 
would be bound to see its flaws. 
Defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause to believe he was guilty of 
disorderly conduct. Moreover, Utah's disorderly conduct statute is a content-neutral 
time, place, and manner restriction. It is similar to several other state disorderly conduct 
statutes that have been upheld against First Amendment and vagueness challenges. The 
statute is not therefore so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of 
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT MAY NOT CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST BY CLAIMING THAT THE 
STATUTE UNDER WHICH THE ARREST OCCURRED IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
Specifically, defendant claims that because the disorderly conduct statute is 
unconstitutional, defendant "did not commit a criminal offense and the officers did not 
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have probable cause to arrest him." Br. Aplt. at 17-18. Defendant further contends that 
because the officers had no probable cause to arrest, all evidence obtained must be 
suppressed. Br. Aplt. at 18. Defendant's argument fails because it relies on the erroneous 
premise that an arrest is unlawful if it is made pursuant to a statute that is later held 
unconstitutional. 
A. Finding that a statute is unconstitutional does not invalidate a prior 
arrest made under the statute. 
It is well settled that "[a] stop or arrest made pursuant to an officer's . . . reliance 
on an ordinance not yet declared unconstitutional is valid, regardless of a subsequent 
judicial determination of its unconstitutionality." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 
(Utah 1996); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1987) (holding that Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police who acted 
in objectively reasonable reliance upon statute authorizing warrantless administrative 
searches, even though statute was later held unconstitutional); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979) (holding that where officer who arrested defendant had abundant 
probable cause to believe defendant's conduct in refusing to identify himself violated city 
ordinance, the arrest of defendant was lawful even though the city ordinance was later 
declared unconstitutional); Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 
357, 365 n.4 (1998) (noting that exclusionary rule does not apply "when the officer 
reasonably relied on a statute later deemed unconstitutional"); United States v. Vanness, 
342 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that "[i]n this analysis we do not decide 
the constitutionality of the ordinance, but merely that it was objectively reasonable for the 
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officers to rely on the noise ordinance"). This rule exists because the purpose of the 
exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action. See DeFillippo, AA3 U.S. at 38 n.3. 
"No conceivable purpose of deterrence would be served by suppressing evidence which, 
at the time it was found on the person of the respondent, was the product of a lawful 
arrest and a lawful search." Id. 
The only exception to this rule is when the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly 
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws." 
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted); see also DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38. In 
such a case, police are expected, like the rest of society, to realize that the statute is 
unconstitutional and act accordingly. 
State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1996) controls this case. Police found 
Chapman parked in an otherwise empty school parking lot late at night. 921 P.2d at 448. 
A Salt Lake County ordinance prohibited anyone from loitering on school grounds 
without a lawful purpose. Id. at 449. Police arrested Chapman and found a stolen gun in 
the vehicle. Id. at 448-49. The State charged Chapman with burglary. Id. at 449. 
Chapman claimed, as did defendant in the instant case, that because the anti-loitering 
ordinance was unconstitutional, the arrest and search incident thereto were unlawful and 
the evidence must be suppressed. Id. at 451. 
The Utah Supreme Court declared, "we hold that the officers were entitled to rely 
upon the ordinance." Id. at 451 n.9. The court further reasoned that, "'[p]olice are 
charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional. The 
enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its 
8 
constitutionality '" Id. at 451-452 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38). 
The court affirmed the denial of Chapman's motion to suppress and did not reach the 
merits of his constitutional claim. Id. at451n.9. 
The instant case is analogous to Chapman in all material respects. Like Chapman, 
defendant was arrested for committing a class C misdemeanor in the officers' presence 
(R. 69:12-13). A search was conducted incident to the arrest revealing evidence giving 
rise to additional charges (R. 35). Like Chapman, defendant now claims the arrest and 
the search incident thereto were unlawful because the statute under which the arrest was 
made is unconstitutional (R. 25-27). This Court should therefore disregard defendant's 
constitutional challenge and affirm his conviction because the officers had probable cause 
to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct, and the disorderly conduct statute is not "so 
grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be 
bound to see its flaws." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted); see also State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App. 1996) ("Utah courts have consistently refused to 
reach the constitutionality of a statute when there are other independent grounds to 
resolve the case."). 
B. Police had probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly 
conduct 
Defendant has never challenged the trial court's conclusion that police had 
probable cause to arrest him for disorderly conduct, except to claim that the statute is 
unconstitutional and therefore no offense occurred (R. 24-26). See Br. Aplt. at 7-8. 
Moreover, by pleading guilty to disorderly conduct, defendant has admitted that his 
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outburst at 7-Eleven satisfied the elements of the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
2(2) (2003) ("A plea of guilty is an acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of the 
offense charged."); Utah R. Crim P. 11(e)(4) (requiring plea-taking court to inform 
defendant that plea of guilty is an admission to all elements of crime). This Court may 
therefore find, based on defendant's guilty plea and his failure to raise the issue before 
the trial court or this Court, that defendant's conduct satisfied the elements of the statute 
and that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct. 
A review of the evidence at the suppression reveals that police did indeed have 
probable cause to arrest defendant for disorderly conduct. Probable cause exists if "at the 
moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within (the arresting 
officer's) knowledge . . . were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the 
(suspect) had committed or was committing an offense." United States v. Gagnon, 635 
F.2d 766, 769 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)), cert, 
denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981). A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if he "makes 
unreasonable noises in a public place" with the intent "to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creat[es] a risk thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102. 
In this case, Officer McAllister heard defendant yelling loudly from seventy feet 
away (R. 42; 69:7-8). He observed three ladies and several children become alarmed as 
defendant yelled (R. 43; 69:6-7, 9-12). Officer McAllister noticed that the lady closest to 
defendant "hurried and got in and drove away . . . to get herself and her kids away from 
him" (R. 43; 69:9). The trial court found that these people were "justifiably alarmed by 
defendant's conduct" (R. 43). Officer McAllister made these observations himself and 
10 
thus "the facts and circumstances within [his] knowledge" were "at the moment [of] the 
arrest" sufficient to lead Officer McAllister believe defendant was committing an offense. 
Gagnon, 635 F.2d at 769. 
C. Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not so grossly and flagrantly 
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be 
bound to see its flaws; in fact, Utah's disorderly conduct statute is 
not unconstitutional under any standard. 
Defendant did not argue in the trial court or to this Court that the disorderly 
conduct statute is so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable 
prudence would be bound to see its flaws. He merely asserts, without analysis or citation 
to authority, that a "reasonably objective police officer should understand fundamental 
constitutional law and recognize that the Defendant's speech is constitutionally 
protected." Br. Aplt. at 19. His failure to address the appropriate standard and 
adequately brief the Court on this crucial issue should foreclose any further 
consideration. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (requiring appellate briefs to contain "the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented" and 
"citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on"); State v. Gamblin, 
2000 UT 44,16, 1 P.3d 1108 (noting that court is not a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments 
that are not adequately briefed."). Even if defendant had cited and argued the appropriate 
standard of constitutionality, his claim would still fail because Utah's disorderly conduct 
statute is not so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable 
11 
prudence would be bound to see its flaws. In fact, the statute withstands constitutional 
scrutiny under any standard. 
Defendant asserts that the disorderly conduct statute is unconstitutional because it 
is overbroad and vague. Br. Aplt. at 12. He also asserts that, as applied to him, the 
statute "infringed on his protected speech" and failed to give him notice that his conduct 
violated the statute. Br. Aplt. at 13, 16. 
1. The statute is not overbroad and did not infringe on defendant's 
protected speech because it is a content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restriction. 
The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth applies to statutes "that are written 
so broadly that they may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties." 
Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 
U.S. 789, 798, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2125 (1984). Statutory overbreadth "is a substantive due 
process question which addresses the issue of whether 'the statute is so broad that it may 
not only prohibit unprotected behavior but may also prohibit protected activity as well.'" 
State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted). "The overbreadth 
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating, 'from the text of [the law] and from actual 
fact,' that substantial overbreadth exists." Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) 
(quoting New York State Club Assn., Inc. v. City of New York 487 U.S. 1, 14, (1988)). 
2
 Even if this Court were to find the statute unconstitutional under the standard used in a 
direct attack on the statute, the remedy would be to vacate defendant's conviction for 
disorderly conduct only. Defendant's conviction for methamphetamine possession must 
stand unless the Court holds the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that 
any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws." Chapman, 921 P.2d 
at 452 (emphasis omitted). 
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"[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views 
at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired." Heffron v. International 
Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). "[E]ven in a public 
forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner 
of protected speech." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); International 
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. at 648. These restrictions need only be 
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech" and be "narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest." Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 468 U.S. at 293. Utah's disorderly conduct statute meets both of these 
requirements and therefore is not so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any 
person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. 
Utah's disorderly conduct statute prohibits "makfing] unreasonable noises in a 
public place" with the intent "to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creat[e] a risk thereof. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-102. It does not 
discriminate against the content of speech, but rather, it applies to any speech that reaches 
an unreasonable level of noise and that is made with intent to annoy or alarm the public. 
Vulgar speech, political speech, commercial speech, and even non-verbal noises such as 
heavy machinery or automobiles are all equally subject to restrictions on their volume 
level without regard to their content. The statute is therefore justified without reference 
to the content of any sound it regulates because its purpose is to protect the public from 
unwanted noise, not to control speech. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791 ("A 
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regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, 
even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.5'). 
The statute also is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. 
"[I]t can no longer be doubted that government 'ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting 
its citizens from unwelcome noise.9" Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 796 (quoting 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 806). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that 
there is a "significant difference between state restrictions on a speaker's right to address 
a willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted communication." Hill 
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715-16 (2000). The instant statute fits within the latter 
category. Its purpose is to protect "'the right to be let alone,'" which is "'the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized [people].'" Id. at 716-17 
(quoting Olmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
Utah's disorderly conduct statute is narrowly tailored to effectuate the 
government's interest because the requirement that the noise be both unreasonable and 
made with intent to inconvenience, annoy, or alarm the public prevents the statute from 
burdening protected speech. The statute permits an individual to say whatever he pleases 
and requires only that the speaker exercise reason in his choice of time, place, and 
manner. Only' speech that has no legitimate purpose and that intrudes on the right of 
others "to be let alone" will satisfy the elements of the disorderly conduct statute. Hill, 
530 U.S. at 716. 
Nor does Utah's disorderly conduct statute violate the First Amendment as applied 
to defendant. Defendant was arrested and convicted not because of what he said, but how 
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he said it and the intent with which he said it. The trial court expressly found, "Although 
the Defendant used profanity, it was not the content of the dialogue, it was the manner 
and tone in which he said the statements that triggered the statute" (R. 44). The record 
supports the court's finding. Officer's testified that defendant was yelling "extremely 
loud[ly]" and could be clearly heard from seventy feet away (R. 69:7-9). Defendant's 
yelling caused visible alarm to the people patronizing the 7-Eleven (R. 69:8-9, 11). It 
was also apparently unprovoked (R. 69:5-7). These facts demonstrate that defendant was 
not arrested for using vulgar language, but rather, he was arrested for an unreasonably 
loud, unprovoked outburst that alarmed those around him and disrupted 7-Eleven's 
business. 
Defendant relies on Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah App. 1990) for his 
claim that the disorderly conduct statute is overbroad and infringed on his First 
Amendment rights. Br. Aplt. at 7-8. Huber is distinguishable from the instant case. 
Huber was stopped by police in the early morning hours in front of his business on 
suspicion a traffic violation. Id. at 1373. During the stop, Huber raised his voice to 
officers and used coarse and vulgar language to demonstrate his displeasure at their 
stopping him. Id. at 1373-74. The officers arrested defendant for disorderly conduct. Id. 
at 1374. A jury convicted him of violation of "a municipal ordinance that renders a 
person guilty of disorderly conduct if, [i]ntending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: . . . (D) He engages in abusive 
or obscene language or makes obscene gestures in a public place.'" Id. (quoting Logan 
City, Utah, Ordinance 12-8-9(2)(D) (Feb. 19, 1987)). 
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On appeal, Huber challenged the ordinance as unconstitutionally overbroad and 
vague. Id. at 1375. This Court determined that the municipal ordinance criminalized 
speech and that it could only withstand a First Amendment challenge if the speech it 
regulated fell within the "fighting words" exception to the First Amendment. Id. at 
1374-75. This Court then held that the word "abusive" gave the statute far greater reach 
than just "fighting words." Id. at 1375. It also held that the intent language did not 
narrow the application of "abusive" to only fighting words, but rather, permitted abusive 
language to be punished if it was only annoying or alarming. Id. The Court also declined 
to give the ordinance a narrowing construction to avoid a constitutional defect because to 
do so would require rewriting the ordinance. Id. at 1376-77. 
The statute in the instant case is distinguishable from the statute in Huber because 
it does not punish any particular category of speech. It only regulates the time, place, and 
manner in which people engage in speech. Unlike the ordinance in Huber, the instant 
statute does not rely on the fighting words exception to regulate the content of speech. It 
merely proscribes speech that, like any other annoying or alarming sound, intrudes on the 
right of others to be free from unwelcome noise. See Hill, 530, U.S. at 715-16 (noting 
that government may protect "'the right to be let alone,'" which is "'the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized [people]" (quoting 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)). It matters not whether a person is 
blowing an air horn or yelling the Pledge of Allegiance at the top of his lungs. If his 
noise level is unreasonable for the circumstances and is made with intent to 
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inconvenience, annoy, or alarm the public, the government may restrict it without 
offending the First Amendment. See id. 
The facts of Huber are also distinguishable from the instant case. There is no 
indication in Huber that Huber's speech reached the level of unreasonable noise. Huber 
was stopped in the early hours of the morning in front of his own business. Huber, 786 
P.2d at 1373. The only people apparently involved were Huber and the two police 
officers, and they were on Huber's private property. Id. (noting that stop occurred in 
parking lot of defendant's business as he walking toward door of his building). Huber 
raised his voice, but there is no evidence that his speech reached the level of an 
unreasonable noise, given the location and the hour. Id. There is also no indication that 
Huber intended to alarm or annoy anyone except the two police officers, who are 
expected to tolerate some criticism. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 
(1987) (noting that individuals are free to oppose or challenge police action without fear 
of arrest). In contrast, the trial court found that defendant's noise level was unreasonable 
under the circumstances and that he did intend to annoy or alarm the other patrons of the 
7-Eleven besides the police officers (R. 43-44). Unlike Huber, defendant was not arrest 
for swearing at the officers—he was arrested for yelling unreasonably in a way that 
disrupted 7-Eleven's business and alarmed its customers. Defendant may not cloak his 
disruptive conduct with protections of the First Amendment merely because he was using 
vulgar language. The First Amendment permits defendant to voice his criticisms to the 
officers at a reasonable, conversational volume level that does not disrupt 7-Eleven's 
business and alarm its patrons. He may not do it, however, in manner that alarms the 
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public and intrudes on their right to be free from unwelcome noise. See Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. at 796. 
Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not overbroad. That, however, is not the 
question before this Court. Defendant can only prevail if the statue is "so grossly and 
flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see 
its flaws." Chapman, 921 P.2d at 452 (emphasis omitted). The U.S. Supreme Court has 
upheld content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions in a variety of settings. See 
Hill v. Colorado, 530, U.S. 703, 730-32 (2000) (upholding statute that prohibited any 
person within 100 feet of a healthcare facility from knowingly approaching within eight 
feet of another person, without that person's consent, to engage in written or oral protest, 
education, or counseling); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 803 (1989) 
(upholding ordinance that required performers in Central Park amphitheater in to use 
sound system and engineers provided by city in order to control volume of performance); 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (upholding statute preventing picketing 
before or about a residence or dwelling); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (upholding ordinance that prohibited 
soliciting at state fair outside of designated areas). Moreover, at least two states have 
upheld against overbreadth challenges disorderly conducts statutes that mirror the 
language of Utah's statute. See Sterling v. State, 701 So.2d 71, 73-74 (Ala. Crim. App. 
1997); People v. Bakolas, 449 N.E.2d 738, 741 (N.Y. 1983). Thus, a person, including a 
police officer, questioning the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute would 
find that the Supreme Court generally upholds statutes that only restrict the time, place, 
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and manner of speech, and that other state's have upheld statutes similar to Utah's. 
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the statute is "so grossly and flagrantly 
unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws." 
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38. 
2. Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
on its face or as applied to defendant. 
"[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Vagueness claims, 
therefore, "'are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute 
adequately notices the proscribed conduct.'" State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f^ 14, 84 
P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987)). "If a statute 
'"is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited,"' it is 
not unconstitutionally vague." Id. (quoting Frampton, 131 P.2d at 191-92) (quoting State 
v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982)). 
"'[Legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional,' and those who 
challenge a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 42, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Greenwood 
v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991); see also U.S v. Welch, 327 
F.3d 1081, 1094 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that when statutes are challenged for vagueness 
"courts begin with the presumption that the statute" is constitutional and '"must be 
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upheld unless satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the legislature went beyond the 
confines of the Constitution'" (quoting United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1004 (10th 
Cir. 2001))). The presumption of constitutionality is especially strong when the statute 
has a mens rea requirement See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979) ("This 
Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is 
closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea."). 
Because Utah's statute only punishes those "intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof," the presumption of 
constitutionality is especially strong. 
Defendant asserts that the statute is vague because it fails to define the term 
"unreasonable noise." Br. Aplt. at 16. There is nothing vague or ambiguous about that 
term. The common meaning of the word "noise" is a "loud, confused, or senseless 
shouting or outcry" or "any sound that is undesired or interferes with ones hearing of 
something." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1533 (3d ed. 1993). By simple 
reference to a dictionary, both law enforcement and citizens can readily determine 
whether a particular sound is "noise." 
The word "unreasonable" is also easily construed. "The word unreasonable is 
often used in the law, and is commonly defined as: not conformable to reason, irrational, 
not governed or influenced by reason, immoderate, excessive, exorbitant, foolish, unwise, 
absurd, silly, preposterous, senseless and stupid" State v. Marker, 536 P.2d 1273, 1275-
76 (Or. Ct. App. 1975). According to the the New York Court of Appeals, "[T]he term 
'unreasonable noise' is not incapable of definition. Rather, it describes a noise of a type 
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or volume that a reasonable persor
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Bakolas, 449 N.E.2d at 740. Reasonableness is, in fact, the best word draw the line 
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unwanted communication," because it incorporates the expeciati.u^ f ;•: = :ncrn?c person 
given the time of day, location, and level of noise. Hill, 530, U.S. at 715—16. 
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.vee rwraey v. State, 922 P.Jd 283 293 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (holding disorderly 
conduct statute overturns: . .IA,. .^ :or vagueness was not vague after legislature 
amended statute to include definition for "unreasonable noise"). More states however. 
have upheld :i\o \, "unreasonable noise" in a disorderly conduct statute against 
vagueness challenges. ..L Mcnmg. . ; 'L . 7 V^ >\ Fitzgerald, a 
103 (Colo. 1978); State v. Anonymous, 298 A.2d 52, 53-54 (Conn 
v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 963-64 (Ind. 1993); Bakolas, 449 N.E.2d at .'40: Marker, 536 
Moreover, a federal disorderly conduct regulation and over a dozen state 
disorderly conduct statutes use the language "unreasonable noise." See Ala. Code § 13A-
I I • ; (20 34 ); \k i« i l a i Stat § 11 51 11 3 (I lichie 200 1); Call I '"eiial Code § 115 ( Vv c , ;t 
2005); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-9-106 (West 2005); Conn. Gen Stat :,|» i : § 53a-182 
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(West 2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 711-1101 (Michie 2003); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-45-
1-3) (West 2004); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 525.060 (West 2004); M.D. Code Ann, 
Criminal Law § 10-201 (2004); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 644:2 (2004); N.Y. Penal Law § 
240.20 (McKinney 2004); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.11 (West 2004); 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 5503 (West 2005); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-13-1 (Michie 2004); Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 39-17-305 (2004); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.01 (Vernon 2004); 13 Vt. 
Stat. Ann. § 1026 (2004); 36 C.F.R. § 2.34. At least four states and the District of 
Columbia have disorderly conduct statutes that prohibit a person from making loud 
noises, but use terms other than "unreasonable" noise. See 2003 111. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-
431 (H.B. 2902) (amending 720 111. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/26-1); Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. 
272 § 53 (West 2004) (prohibiting "persons who with offensive . . . language accost or 
annoy persons"); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.72 (West 2004) (prohibiting "boisterous or 
noisy conduct"); N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C: 33-2 (2004) (prohibiting "loud and offensive 
language"); D.C. Code Ann. § 22-1321 (2004) (prohibiting "shout[ing] or mak[ing] a 
noise . . . to the annoyance or disturbance" of others); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 947.01 (West 
2004) (prohibiting "unreasonably loud" conduct). 
Against this background, Utah's disorderly conduct statute is not "so grossly and 
flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see 
its flaws." DeFillippo, AA3 U.S. at 38. Moreover, ordinary people and law enforcement 
would understand that yelling vulgarities at police officers without reason or provocation 
in the parking lot of a convenience store constitutes unreasonable noise and creates a 
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substantial risk that others in the parking lot will be alarmed. This is especially true when 
the yelling evokes a visible reaction of alarm from the other patrons of the store (R. 69:9). 
• CONCI I ISION • 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Mc<pc * " " • " . - • • - ' • 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL W$E} 
404*^6 
MATTHEW D. BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
S T A 1 T < : • ' • i \, 
Plaintiff, 
RlCMAiviJ KhiNiNH I i i LAMBbl H, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i. use . • .•.:'u.'-. 7 
Judge Roger S. Dutson $£ft « 
; This Court hereby denies the Defendant's MXK-P ' ^ •. ''' •• • <'". •• r r.-ji.-,-s i^e 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On December 18, 2003 at approximately 3:45 p.m., Sergeant Chris McAllister ("Sgt. 
McAllister") and Detective Tony Hanson ("Det. Hanson") parked their vehicles on the 
3. 
I" LIS LSI Liv v'i MJVcL. 
As Sgt. McAllister and Det, Hanson were walking toward the entrance of 7-11, they^gard the 
Defendani v-M - n- -king iVs!" 
Det. Hanson said to Sgt. McAllister, "Isn't that Richard Lambeth?" Sgt. McAllister looked 
toward the Defendant who was standing near tlu v?s pin--p^ ••• p^ wimat Jv 7^ fV,>* •. v. MV T T . 
recognized the Defendant as a person he had met on various other occasions. 
1 
U'-i '-
4. A woman and her children were nearby when the Defendant began to yell. The woman was 
in the process of pumping gas into a mini-van. The woman's eyes grew larger and she 
seemed to hurry her activities. 
5. Sgt. McAllister and Det. Hanson ignored the Defendant and continued walking toward the 
entrance of the store. 
6. Again, in a louder voice, the Defendant yelled at the officers. This time the Defendant 
hollered, "Suck my Dick!" 
7. Sgt. McAllister asked the Defendant to stop yelling, and the Defendant yelled back loudly, 
"Fuck!" 
8. As the Defendant was yelling, two ladies were walking out of 7-11. These patrons appeared to 
be disturbed by the Defendant's conduct. 
9. Sgt. McAllister decided to place the Defendant under arrest for disorderly conduct. 
10. He called another officer to transport the Defendant. 
11. The Defendant asked to speak to Sgt. McAllister. When Sgt. McAllister finally relented and 
went to the car where the Defendant was sitting, the Defendant apologized for yelling at the 
officers. 
12. The convenience store parking lot is a public place. 
13. The women and children in the nearby vicinity of the Defendant were justifiably alarmed by 
the Defendant's conduct. 
2 
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1 1- •!: '. •„ ,: •• c i^ L'icnuaiiL usee prolyl!-y. n ••* a.s not the content of the dialogue, it was the 
manner and tone in which he said the statements that triggered the statute. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. 'ire Defendant's nmdiirl fills wiihlit llir pn w i ,iun nf tin* DI,.I Htlciiy Conduct statute* lliut 
reads, the Defendant "intended to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly created a risk thereof (ii) made unreasonable noises in a pi iblic place." 
2 ie Defendant's conduct was not protected by the First Amendment freedom of speech 
clause. 
D k I ED this ^ ' i»f Febmasy, 2004 
JUDGE^OGER S. DUTSON 
Second Judicial District Court 
Approved as to form: 
BKENDA J. BEATQ 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
MICHAEL D. BOUWHUIS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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